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SURVEY OF NEW YORK PRACTICE
settlement. Indeed, the defendant never contested the existence or the
terms of the agreement in question."5
ARTICLE 30- REmEmDIES AND PLEADING
CPLR 3015: Particularity as to special damages.
Subdivision (d), which required the itemization of special damages
in the pleadings, has been repealed and subdivision (e) has been re-
lettered as subdivision (d). Itemization of special damages is left to the
bill of particulars.
A caveat to the bar: Special damages must still be pleaded where
they are an essential element of a cause of action.88
CPLR 3021: Mere allegation of improper verification does not man-
date rebuttal.
In 1965, section 741 of the RPAPL was amended to require veri-
fied petitions in proceedings to regain possession of real property. Thus,
such petitions must be verified pursuant to CPLR 302187 to avoid the
possible penalty for improper verification contained in CPLR 3022,
viz., that such pleadings may be treated as a nullity if the adverse party
so notifies opposing counsel.
In Gould v. Pollack,"" the defendant contended that the petition
had not been properly verified and sought to raise an issue of fact as
to whether the petition had actually been verified. In rejecting these
allegations, the New York City Civil Court, New York County, noted
that the instant affidavit followed the form required by CPLR 3021.s9
Moreover, where no issue of fact as to the authenticity of the verifi-
cation was shown, the plaintiff had "no duty ... to call the Notary
Public as a witness."90
The lack of any proof of irregularity concerning the petition's
verification dearly justifies the instant decision, which forestalls the
delay of summary proceedings which an opposite holding would have
produced. Moreover, assuming arguendo that the petition was de-
fectively verified, the CPLR states that "[d]efects [in pleadings] shall be
ignored if a substantial right of a party is not prejudiced." 91
85 38 App. Div. 2d at 814, 528 N.Y.S.2d at 902.
8 CPLR 8013.
87 Note that the wording of the section is not mandatory. See 3 WK&M 3021.02. In
addition the Court of Appeals has adopted a "substantial compliance" test for determining
whether verification is proper. In re Macaulay, 94 N.Y. 574, 577-78 (1884).
88 68 Misc. 2d 670, 327 N.Y.S.2d 808 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. N.Y. County 1971).
s9 ld. at 676, 327 N.Y.S.2d at 815.
90 ld.
91 CPLR 3026. For a case adopting this approach, see Capital Newspapers DiV.-Hearst
1972]
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
CPLR 3041: A demand in a bill of particulars for identification of
witnesses is permissible under special circumstances.
Generally, the purposes of a bill of particulars are amplification of
the pleading, prevention of surprise at trial, and limitation of the
scope of proof.92 The bill was not intended as a means of eliciting evi-
dence or obtaining the names of witnesses.93 However, courts will
allow a demand for such information under special circumstances. 94
Such circumstances were found in Block v. Fairbairn,9 5 where the
plaintiff, a dog-bite victim, was required to furnish the identity of
persons who were with him at the time of the incident. 98 In so holding,
the Supreme Court, Ulster County, advocated the expansion of the
scope of the bill of particulars as a means of reducing the expense of
litigation, citing the increasing cost of the record of examinations
before trial, the usual device by which such information is obtained.
It has been argued that the bill of particulars "imposes burdens
on the parties and the court that far outweigh the modicum of added
intelligence that may be afforded by [its] use... ."97 Nevertheless, the
idea that the scope of the bill of particulars should be expanded in this
regard certainly has merit. It mirrors a welcome judicial inclination
toward making the courts more accessible to many litigants for whom
the cost of the record of an examination before trial would otherwise
be prohibitive.
CPLR 3042: Attorney personally fined for ignoring a demand for a
bill of particulars.
Blanchfield Storage, Inc. v. State98 involved a motion to vacate a
conditional preclusion order which had been granted to the State after
Corp. v. Vanderbilt, 44 Misc. 2d 542, 254 N.Y.S.2d 309 (Sup. Ct. Albany County 1964).
Therein, the court held that a complaint demanding injunctive relief would not be dis-
missed for defective verification where the defendant would not be substantially preju-
diced if the defect were ignored.
92 Elman v. Ziegfeld, 200 App. Div. 494, 193 N.Y.S. 133 (1st Dep't 1922).
93W. R. Simmons & Assocs. Research, Inc. v. Ziff-Davis Publishing Co., 37 Misc. 2d
62, 234 N.Y.S.2d 991 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1962); Slawson v. Murphy, 37 N.Y.S.2d 930
(Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1942). See generally 6 CARMODY-WArr 2d § 36:3 (1968).
94 H. WACHTELL, NEw YoRK PRACcF UNDER THE CPLR 230-31 (3d ed. 1970). See In re
Cohn's Estate, 41 Misc. 2d 36, 244 N.Y.S.2d 669 (Sur. Ct. N.Y. County 1963).
05 68 Misc. 2d 931, 328 N.Y.S2d 497 (Sup. Ct. Ulster County 1972).
90 The court also allowed, inter alia, the defendant's demand for information as to
whether the dog was claimed to have bitten anyone in the past, stating that it "would
prevent surprise at the trial and would permit the defendants to investigate such claim
prior to trial." Id. at 933, 328 N.Y.S.2d at 500. Three other dog-bite cases have
similarly permitted the use of the device for the identification of previous victims. Diskin
v. St. Martin's Roman Catholic Church, 2 App. Div. 2d 901, 157 N.Y.S.2d 144 (2d Dep't
1956); Drake v. Hess, 281 App. Div. 1074, 122 N.Y.S.2d 32 (4th Dep't 1953) (per curiam);
Robson v. Driscoll, 278 App. Div. 847, 104 N.Y.S.2d 334 (2d Dep't 1951).
97 3 WK&M 3041.05.
98 69 Misc. 2d 487, 330 N.Y.S.2d 139 (Ct. Cl. 1972) (mem.).
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